Where innovation creates value

Where innovation creates value

It doesn’t matter where scientific discoveries and breakthrough technologies originate—for national prosperity, the important thing is who commercializes them. The United States is not behind in that race.

FEBRUARY 2009 • Amar Bhidé

Now, perhaps, more than ever, the fear of globalization haunts the United States. Many manufacturing companies that once flourished there fell to overseas competition or relocated much of their work abroad. Then services embarked on the same journey. Just as the manufacturing exodus started with low-wage, unskilled labor, the offshoring of services at first involved data entry, routine software programming and testing, and the operation of phone banks. But today, overseas workers analyze financial statements, test trading strategies, and design computer chips and software architectures for US companies.

It is the offshoring of research and development—of innovation and the future—that arouses the keenest anxiety. The economist Richard Freeman spoke for many Americans when he warned that the United States could become significantly less competitive “as large developing countries like China and India harness their growing scientific and engineering expertise to their enormous, low-wage labor forces.”1 What is the appropriate response? One, from the conservative pundit Pat Buchanan, the TV broadcaster Lou Dobbs, and their like, calls for protectionism. Another, seemingly more progressive, approach would be to spend more money to promote cutting-edge science and technology. Much of the establishment, Democratic and Republican alike, has embraced what the economists Sylvia Ostry and Richard Nelson call techno-nationalism and techno-fetishism, which both claim that US prosperity requires continued domination of these fields.

We’ve heard such fears and prescriptions before. In the 1980s, many people attributed the problems of the US economy to the proliferation of lawyers and managers and to a shortage of engineers and scientists; Germany and Japan were praised as countries with a better occupational ratio. Yet in the 1990s, their economies slackened while the United States prospered—and not because it heeded the warnings. Indeed, math and science education in US high schools didn’t improve much. Enrollment in law schools remained high, and managers accounted for a growing proportion of the workforce. The US share of scientific articles, science and engineering PhDs, and patents continued to decline, the service sector to expand, and manufacturing employment to stagnate.

Of course, the United States can’t count on the same happy ending to every episode of the “losing our lead” serial. The integration of China and India into the global economy is a seminal and unprecedented phenomenon. Could the outcome be different this time? Is the United States on the verge of being pummeled by a technological hurricane? In my view, the answer is no. Worries about the offshoring of R&D and the progress of science in China and India arise from a failure to understand technological innovation and its relation to the global economy. Innovation does play a major role in nurturing prosperity, but we must be careful to formulate policies that sustain rather than undermine it—for instance, by favoring one form of innovation over another.
Three levels of innovation

Innovation involves the development of new products or processes and the know-how that begets them. New products can take the form of high-level building blocks or raw materials (for example, microprocessors or the silicon of which they are made), midlevel intermediate goods (motherboards with components such as microprocessors), and ground-level final products (such as computers). Similarly, the underlying know-how for new products includes high-level general principles, midlevel technologies, and ground-level, context-specific rules of thumb. For microprocessors, this know-how includes the laws of solid-state physics (high level), circuit designs and chip layouts (midlevel), and the tweaking of conditions in semiconductor fabrication plants to maximize yields and quality (ground level).

Technological innovations, especially high-level ones, usually have limited economic or commercial importance unless complemented by lower-level innovations. Breakthroughs in solid-state physics, for example, have value for the semiconductor industry only if accompanied by new microprocessor designs, which themselves may be largely useless without plant-level tweaks that make it possible to produce these components in large quantities. A new microprocessor’s value may be impossible to realize without new motherboards and computers, as well.

New know-how and products also require interconnected, nontechnological innovations on a number of levels. A new diskless (thin-client) computer, for instance, generates revenue for its producer and value for its users only if it is marketed effectively and deployed properly. Marketing and organizational innovations are usually needed; for example, such a computer may force its manufacturer to develop a new sales pitch and materials and its users to reorganize their IT departments.

Arguing about which innovations or innovators make the greatest contribution to economic prosperity, however, isn’t helpful, for they all play necessary and complementary roles. Innovations that sustain prosperity are developed and used in a huge game involving many players working on many levels over many years.

Consider, for instance, the story of the key active component in almost all modern electronics: the transistor. A pair of German physicists obtained the first patents for it in the 1920s and ’30s. In 1947, William Shockley and two colleagues at Bell Labs built the first practical point-contact transistor, which Bell used only in small quantities. In 1950, Shockley developed the radically different bipolar junction transistor and licensed it to companies such as Texas Instruments, which at first implemented it in a limited run of radios that were used as a sales tool. Within two decades, transistors had replaced vacuum tubes in radios and TVs and spawned a whole world of new devices, such as electronic calculators and personal computers.

The German physicists’ discoveries began an extended process of developing know-how at a number of levels. Some steps involved high-level discoveries, such as the transistor effect, which earned Shockley and his colleagues a Nobel Prize. Other steps, such as those needed to obtain high production yields in semiconductor plants, called for lower-level, context-specific knowledge.

A similar complexity characterizes globalization. A variety of cross-border flows can be important to innovators—for instance, the diffusion of scientific principles and technological breakthroughs, the licensing of know-how, the export and import of final products, the procurement of intermediate goods and services (offshoring), equity investments, and the use of immigrant labor. Many kinds of global interactions have become more common, but not in a uniform way: international trade in manufactured goods has soared, but most services remain untraded. Of the many activities in the innovation game, only some are performed well in remote, low-cost locations; many midlevel activities, for example, are best conducted close to potential customers.
Where technomania goes wrong

Techno-nationalists and techno-fetishists oversimplify innovation by equating it with discoveries announced in scientific journals and with patents for cutting-edge technologies developed in university or commercial research labs. Since they rarely distinguish between the different levels and kinds of know-how, they ignore the contributions of the other players—contributions that don’t generate publications or patents.

They oversimplify globalization as well—for example, by assuming that high-level ideas and know-how rarely if ever cross national borders and that only the final products made with it are traded. Actually, ideas and technologies move from country to country quite easily, but much final output, especially in the service sector, does not. The findings of science are available—for the price of learned books and journals—to any country that can use them. Advanced technology, by contrast, does have commercial value because it can be patented, but patent owners generally don’t charge higher fees to foreigners. In the early 1950s, what was then a tiny Japanese company called Sony was among the first licensors of Bell Labs’ transistor patent, for $50,000.

In a world where breakthroughs travel easily, their national origins are fundamentally unimportant. Notwithstanding the celebrated claim of the author and New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, it doesn’t matter that Google’s search algorithm was developed in California. An Englishman invented the World Wide Web’s protocols in a Swiss lab. A Swede and a Dane started Skype, the leading provider of peer-to-peer Internet telephony, in Estonia. To be sure, the foreign provenance of such advances does not harm the US economy .

Case in point: Innovation in health care

The medical sector illustrates the high-level bias of public policy, as well as the large potential benefits of focusing more on the development and use of mid- and ground-level innovations. The United States spends more of its national income on health care—about 16 percent of GDP—than any other country. Yet in many ways it isn’t getting value for the money.1In 2007, 40 countries had lower infant mortality rates and 44 had a higher life expectancy.

Skimpy government support for high-level medical research certainly isn’t the problem. On the contrary, from 1998 to 2003 government funding for health care R&D, as a proportion of 2004 GDP, was more than ten times higher in the United States than in Austria, Sweden, or Switzerland—which had lower infant mortality rates and higher life expectancies. And government-funded research is far from the whole story: foundations and for-profit companies put up much more money than the tax-funded National Institutes of Health does.

Yet some people in the United States worry that China and India threaten US preeminence in basic medical research. In February 2006, for example, Business Week warned that China’s State Council had substantially increased R&D funding, with biotechnology at the top of the list. The story highlights an experimental gene therapy, for treating cancers, in which the country was ominously said to be “racing to a lead.” 2 How would US health care or economic prosperity suffer if government subsidies in China made it possible to cure cancers? An obsession with staying ahead in every possible frontier of medical research diverts money and attention from health services reform, which would provide far greater payoffs that would remain largely in the United States. Some experts advocate a broader role for the government in fixing the system’s troubles, others a more market-oriented approach. But almost all experts agree that the solution isn’t more or better medical research—it’s changing the game so that hospitals will be better managed, IT used more widely and effectively, and insurance schemes better organized.

In the effort to reform health care services, innovative entrepreneurs could play an important role, if they were allowed to do so. Although they have improved productivity in just about every other sector of the US economy, in the “bloated, inefficient health care system,” as Harvard’s Regina Herzlinger observes, innovation has been restricted to medical technologies and health insurance. Entrepreneurs have difficulty attempting to provide care at lower cost—the heart of any real solution—because “status quo providers, abetted by legislators and insurance companies, have made it virtually impossible for them to succeed.” 3
Notes

1. See Diana M. Farrell, Eric S. Jensen, and Bob Kocher, “Why Americans pay more for health care,” mckinseyquarterly.com, December 2008.

2. Bruce Einhorn, “A cancer treatment you can’t get here,” Business Week, March 6, 2006.

3. Regina Herzlinger, Who Killed Health Care? America’s $2 Trillion Medical Problem—and the Consumer-Driven Cure, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007.


What is true for breakthroughs from Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, and Estonia is true as well for those from China, India, and other emerging economies. We should expect—and desire—that as prosperity spreads, more places will contribute to humanity’s stock of scientific and technological knowledge. The nations of the earth are not locked into a winner-take-all race for leadership in these fields: the enhancement of research capabilities in China and India, and thus their share of cutting-edge work, will improve living standards in the United States, which, if anything, should encourage these developments rather than waste valuable resources fighting them.

The willingness and ability of lower-level players to create new know-how and products is at least as important to an economy as the scientific and technological breakthroughs on which they rest. Without radio manufacturers such as Sony, for instance, transistors might have remained mere curiosities in a lab. Maryland has a higher per capita income than Mississippi not because Maryland is or was an extremely significant developer of breakthrough technologies but because of its greater ability to benefit from them. Conversely, the city of Rochester, New York—home to Kodak and Xerox—is reputed to have one of the highest per capita levels of patents of all US cities. It is far from the most economically vibrant among them, however.

More than 40 years ago, the British economists Charles Carter and Bruce Williams warned that “it is easy to impede [economic] growth by excessive research, by having too high a percentage of scientific manpower engaged in adding to the stock of knowledge and too small a percentage engaged in using it. This is the position in Britain today.”2 It is very much to the point that the United States has not only great scientists and research labs but also many players that can exploit high-level breakthroughs regardless of where they originate. An increase in the supply of high-level know-how, no matter what its source, provides more raw material for mid- and ground-level innovations that raise US living standards.

Techno-fetishism and techno-nationalism also ignore the implications of the service sector’s ever-growing share of the US economy. Manufacturing, with just 12 percent of US GDP, accounts for some 42 percent of the country’s R&D and employs a disproportionately large number of its scientists, technicians, and engineers. Services, with about 70 percent of US GDP, accounts for a disproportionately low one. But this doesn’t mean that the service sector shuns innovation. As the economist Dirk Pilat notes, “R&D in services is often different in character from R&D in manufacturing. It is less oriented toward technological developments and more at codevelopment, with hardware and software suppliers, of ways to apply technology” to products.3 Whatever proportion of resources a manufacturing economy should devote to formal research (or research labs) and to educating scientists, the appropriate proportion would be lower in a services-based economy.

Consider a particularly important aspect of the US service sector: its use of innovations in information technology. It simply doesn’t matter where they were developed; the benefits accrue mainly to US workers and consumers because, in contrast to manufacturing, most services generated in the United States are consumed there. Suppose that IT researchers in, say, Germany create an application that helps retailers to cut inventories. Wal-Mart Stores and many of its US competitors have shown conclusively that they are much more likely to use such technologies than retailers in, for example, Germany, where regulations and a preference for picturesque but inefficient small-scale shops discourage companies from taking a chance on anything new. That is among the main reasons why since the mid-1990s, productivity and incomes have grown faster in the United States than in Europe and Japan.
Changing course

Since innovation is not a zero-sum game among nations, and high-level science and engineering are no more important than the ability to use them in mid- and ground-level innovations, the United States should reverse policies that favor the one over the other, and it should cease to worry that the forward march of the rest of the human race will reduce it to ruin.

One obvious example of its mistaken policies is the provision of subsidies and grants for R&D but not for the marketing of products or for the development of ground-level know-how to help the people who use them. Similarly, companies such as Wal-Mart have very large IT budgets and staffs that develop a great deal of ground-level expertise and even develop in-house systems. But none of this qualifies for R&D incentives.

Policies to promote long-term investment by providing tax credits for capital equipment and for brick-and-mortar structures seem outdated as well. The purchase price of enterprise-resource-planning systems, for example, is just a fraction of the total cost of the projects to implement them. Yet businesses eligible for investment-tax credits to buy computer hardware or software don’t receive tax breaks for the cost of training users, adapting hardware and software systems to the specific needs of a company, or reengineering its business processes to accommodate them.

Immigration policies that favor high-level research by preferring highly trained engineers and scientists to people who hold only bachelor’s degrees are misguided too. By working in, say, the IT departments of retailers and banks, immigrants who don’t have advanced degrees probably make as great a contribution to the US economy as those who do. Likewise, the US patent system is excessively attuned to the needs of R&D labs and not enough to those of innovators developing mid- and ground-level products, which often don’t generate patentable intellectual property under current rules and are often threatened by easily obtained high-level patents.

Thomas Friedman to the contrary, the world is hardly flat: China and India aren’t close to catching up with the United States in the ability to develop and use technological innovations. Starting afresh may allow these countries to leapfrog ahead in some respects—building advanced mobile-phone networks, for example. But excelling in the overall innovation game requires a great and diverse team, which takes a very long time to build. Japan, for instance, began to modernize itself in the late 1860s. Within a few decades, it had utterly transformed its industry, educational system, and military. Today, the country’s highly developed economy makes important contributions to technological progress. Yet after nearly 150 years of modernization, Japan remains behind the United States in the overall capacity to develop and use those innovations, as average productivity data show. South Korea and Taiwan, which have enjoyed truly miraculous growth rates since the 1970s, are still further behind. Do China and India have any real likelihood, at any time in the foreseeable future, of attaining the parity with the United States that has so far eluded Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan?

Complacency is dangerous, but fretting over imaginary threats impairs the ability to address real ones. A misguided fear of scientific and technological progress in China and India distracts Americans both from its benefits and from the important problems created by the integration of these two countries into the global economy—such as the soaring per capita fossil fuel consumption of more than two billion people. We do have much to worry about. Let’s worry about the right things.


About the Author

Amar Bhidé is the Lawrence D. Glaubinger Professor of Business at Columbia University. This article summarizes the first and last chapters of his book The Venturesome Economy: How Innovation Sustains Prosperity in a More Connected World (Princeton University Press, 2008).

Notes

1. See Ashley Pettus, “Overseas insourcing,” Harvard Magazine, 2005, Volume 108, Number 2.

2. Charles F. Carter and Bruce R. Williams, “Government scientific policy and the growth of the British economy,” The Manchester School, 1964, Volume 32, Number 3, pp. 197–214.

3. Dirk Pilat, “Innovation and productivity in services: State of the art,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2001.

森林裡的蘑菇為什麼都有圓點？

桃太郎為什麼是從桃子裡生出來的，橘子就不行嗎？從生物學、植物學的角度重新拆解童話故事中的情節，會讓我們看到意想不到的謎底。

【龜兔賽跑】

動作遲緩而被兔子取笑的烏龜，大膽的向兔子提議，比比看誰比較快跑到山腳下。從起跑線開始就以飛快速度衝出去的兔子，跑了一會兒回頭一看，發現烏龜還離得很遠。因此，兔子決定小睡一會兒。而烏龜的速度雖然很慢，但不眠不休踏著穩健的腳步向終點邁進，終於追過了兔子。睡過頭的兔子睜開眼睛，發現烏龜已經先抵達終點。

兔子與烏龜賽跑，如果認真跑起來，兔子的速度當然比較快。但我們可以發現，烏龜其實也挺逞強的。如果兔子沒有在中途打盹，牠打算怎麼做呢？恐怕烏龜早有勝算。要不是這樣，應該不會貿然向兔子提出挑戰，以賽跑來分勝負。

烏龜發狠，提出要和兔子賽跑到對面小山的山腳下。沒錯，這正是烏龜的策略。其實，兔子是短跑健將，牠最大的優點就是行動迅速，一旦遭到敵人襲擊，會敏捷的跳進樹叢裡躲起來，但牠並不擅長長跑。烏龜很清楚這點，才邀兔子跑長途賽。

烏龜的勝利方程式

兔子毫無警覺的掉進烏龜的算計裡，還在重要比賽中犯了致命的錯誤。人類在跑步時會出汗，以流汗來防止體溫過度升高。然而，兔子的汗腺不發達，無法以流汗來降低體溫。兔子是靠牠的長耳朵來吹風散熱，使血液冷卻、降低體溫。所以，兔子跑步時必須豎著耳朵跑。

但事情總有例外。翻看《兔子與烏龜》的繪本會發現，書上畫的兔子一定是垂著耳朵跑。這可能是兔子為了讓烏龜瞧瞧牠御風而跑的英姿吧，但牠這樣跑久了，身體吃不消。本來就只擅長短跑的兔子，由於耳朵沒迎風散熱，體溫不斷升高的結果，身體很快就熱得受不了。於是，跑累了的兔子不得不睡個覺。事後，兔子應該會後悔：至少不要只有外表看起來很酷，如果一直豎著耳朵跑的話……。

兔子眼睛不全是紅的

龜兔賽跑的結局，兔子的確因為輸給烏龜而自食苦果。但不知為何，自古還有很多關於兔子被弄哭的傳說。在傳說故事中，經常描述兔子哭了之後眼睛變紅的情節。至於兔子的眼睛為什麼是紅色的？

仔細觀察兔子可以發現，並不是所有兔子的眼睛都是紅色的。有紅色眼睛的兔子通常是白兔。眼睛黑色者是因為瞳孔四周有黑色素（melanin）。但小白兔的瞳孔四周沒有黑色素，眼球是透明的，經由眼球反射眼底的血管，使得小白兔的眼睛看起來是紅色的。

相傳白兔之所以有紅眼，是因為人工飼養的關係。其實，白兔是基因突變後不具黑色素的兔子。生物會出現少有的色素消失的基因突變現象，稱為白化症（albino）。然而，白色個體在自然界非常醒目，很容易遭天敵襲擊，所以白化症的生物很難在自然界生存。從前的人把白狐狸或白蛇等視為神的使者，非常敬畏牠們，就是因為稀有的緣故。由於人們非常珍視無法在大自然中生存的白化生物，所以經由飼養產生白色兔子。除了兔子之外，白色家鼷鼠（house mouse，學名Mus musculus）也是白化症的好例子。此外，植物界也可以看到白化症。如白花椰菜（cauliflower）就是從綠花椰菜（broccoli）基因突變而成的，我們平常吃的白色金針菇來自發生基因變異的茶褐色菇類。

相較於人工飼養出來的白兔子，野生的兔子多半是茶色或灰色。但為了能在下雪的地方生存，有些野生兔子冬天時會長出具保護色彩的白毛，這不是因為失去色素。野生兔子的毛色即使是白色的，眼睛也不會是紅色。

【螞蟻與蟋蟀】

夏天時，螞蟻為了儲存冬天的糧食勤奮工作，蟋蟀卻無視於螞蟻的忠告，整天只知道唱歌和玩樂。不久，冬天來臨，到處都找不到食物，蟋蟀哀求螞蟻說：「我的肚子快餓扁了，請分點食物給我吧！」可是，螞蟻拒絕的說：「當夏天我們在工作的時候，你只知道唱歌，所以沒辦法給你食物。」

蟋蟀、螽斯等會叫的昆蟲，經常被描寫成很會演奏樂器的音樂家。 當然，真實世界裡的蟋蟀並不會拿樂器。那麼，蟋蟀是怎麼演奏出美妙的音樂呢？蟋蟀的翅膀是銼刀狀，相互摩擦就能發出聲音。這個構造和小提琴等弦樂器，靠弓弦的摩擦發出聲音一樣。

一提到和蟋蟀一樣能大聲鳴叫的昆蟲，大家一定會聯想到蟬。但蟬和蟋蟀的發聲結構完全不同。

蟬的腹部有震動膜，震動此一震動膜所發出的聲音，在其腹部的空腔內產生共鳴，製造出更大的聲音。這樣的發聲器官，和太鼓發出聲音的構造非常類似。

蟋蟀真的是懶惰鬼嗎？

儘管如此，蟬和蟋蟀的鳴叫聲還是很吵。叫得這麼大聲，難道牠們自己不覺得煩嗎？以《法布爾昆蟲記》聞名的法布爾（Jean-Henri Fabre），也曾對蟬的聽覺抱持疑問。為了確認蟬的聽覺，他大膽的在有蟬叫的大樹下鳴放大砲。實驗結果令人驚訝。蟬並沒有因為大砲聲而安靜下來，反而繼續大聲鳴叫。因此，法布爾做了一個結論：蟬是聾子。

然而，日後證實法布爾的想法是錯的。其實，昆蟲只對固定的聲波有反應，也就是只聽得到某些聲波範圍內的聲音。因此，蟬對大砲的聲音沒有反應。根據不同品種，蟬的聲波頻率為兩千至兩千九百赫，蟋蟀則超過九千五百赫。因此，不管蟬叫聲多麼吵鬧，蟋蟀也不會有任何怨言。

在《伊索寓言》中被烙印上懶惰印記的蟋蟀，真的只知道玩樂嗎？

當然，蟬和蟋蟀在夏天大聲唱歌，並非為了玩樂。大家都知道，只有雄性的蟬和蟋蟀會叫。而牠們之所以鳴叫，都是為了求偶，吸引雌性的注意。此外，這種舉動也有向同類的雄性彰顯勢力範圍，不讓對方靠近的作用。也就是說，蟬和蟋蟀是為了傳宗接代才拚命鳴叫，絕不是在玩樂。

反觀，批評蟋蟀的螞蟻又如何呢？牠們根本不必尋找配偶，只知道拚命搬運食物。雖然專心工作過日子的感覺很酷，但光是拚命工作就可以傳宗接代嗎？大家都知道，螞蟻的社會是以蟻后為中心來建立階級，不同階級的螞蟻各自扮演不同的角色。例如，在工蟻中，有負責搬運食物的工蟻，也有負責照顧幼蟻的工蟻。兵蟻則擔任防止入侵者的衛兵角色。不過，連工蟻也應該留下後代。事實上，工蟻是靠勤奮工作、好好照顧幼蟻留下後代。

道金斯（Richard Dawkins）在《自私的基因》（The Selfish Gene）中闡明，所有生物體內的遺傳基因，都在進行利己的行動。換言之，生物繁衍的目的不是傳宗接代，而是想留下自己的遺傳基因。

由於是同一隻蟻后所生，所有工蟻都是姊妹關係。對工蟻而言，維持姊妹的團體生活，使得姊妹當中順利產生蟻后來產卵繁衍後代，留下與自己相同的遺傳基因，比繁衍自己的孩子更重要。也就是說，為了整個蟻巢做出自我犧牲的行為，反而是使整個螞蟻族群繁衍下去、留下自己遺傳基因的利己行為。

為了談一個夏日戀情而活的蟋蟀和蟬，與為了工作而活的螞蟻，乍看之下好像彼此的生活方式完全不同，但其實有同樣的目的，就是留下自己的遺傳基因。

螞蟻不是想像中的工作狂

螞蟻一直教導蟋蟀勤奮工作的重要性，但螞蟻真的是工作狂嗎？在《螞蟻與蟋蟀》故事中，一直在酷熱的夏天勤奮工作的螞蟻，據說溫度太高的日子一樣處於休息狀態。由於昆蟲是變溫動物，氣溫太高會使牠們活動力減緩。事實上，夏天開花的植物如牽牛花、鴨跖草等，大部分是在上午涼爽的時候開花，因為一到下午天氣變熱，蜜蜂和虻（horse fly）等幫忙傳播花粉的昆蟲就不會出現。不僅是工蟻，工蜂等也會在天氣熱時好好休息。

但關於螞蟻的工作實情，還有更驚人的研究結果。螞蟻總是給人勤奮工作的印象，但據說真正在工作的螞蟻只有八成，剩下的兩成只是假裝很勤奮的樣子，其實在混水摸魚。更令人玩味的是，如果移除這兩成怠工的螞蟻，在下次出勤的螞蟻中，同樣會出現怠工現象，而且也占全體的兩成。人類世界其實適用同樣的法則。連最勤奮工作的螞蟻都出現怠工者，我們人類老想偷懶的想法也就不足為奇了。

【傑克與豆子】

傑克把母牛帶到市場賣的途中，用牛和一位不認識的老爺爺交換了豆子。傑克的母親非常生氣，把豆子丟到窗外；隔天早上，豆子很快變成一株直達天上的大樹。爬上豆子樹到了天上的傑克，從巨人家盜走金幣、會生金蛋的雞和會唱歌的豎琴。巨人發現之後追著傑克，傑克的母親在傑克到達地面時，用斧頭砍倒豆子樹，巨人就摔死了。從此以後，傑克和母親靠著從巨人那裡得到的寶物，過著幸福的生活。

傑克真的有到天上去嗎？

一夜之間就長到天上的豆子樹，究竟是什麼植物？植物的確會在夜間生長，但可能長得這麼快嗎？

一般植物的種子是由胚及胚乳構成的，胚就像植物的胎兒，胚乳則是植物發芽時的營養來源。然而，豆科的種子卻不一樣。我們來看看比較容易觀察的蠶豆吧！蠶豆的種子裡只有兩片子葉，也就是它沒有胚乳。那麼蠶豆發芽時，是從哪裡獲得必要的營養來源呢？

其實，它的營養成分都在子葉裡。如果把蠶豆播種在泥土裡，最先冒出來的就是肥厚的子葉。那兩片子葉是蠶豆的能量庫。豆科植物是以內藏能量庫的方式，有效活用種子裡有限的空間，才得以順利生長。

不過，這樣只解決了植物發芽時的問題。不管芽發得多快，植物發芽之後，怎樣才能快速生長呢？

關於蔓生植物生長秘密的提示，就在本篇這個故事的標題裡。我查了一下原作發現，這個故事的標題原本並不是「傑克與豆子」，而是「傑克與蔓生的豆子」。這樣大家就可以理解了吧！蔓生的豆子就是指生長快速的蔓生植物。

一般植物的生長要靠莖來支撐，需要健壯的莖。但蔓生植物只須攀附在其他植物或支柱上就能生長，不需要健壯的莖，因此可以用多餘的能量來生長和伸展。如此一來，就可以在短時間內看到蔓生植物明顯的生長。此外，蔓生植物輸送水分的導管及輸送養分的篩管都很粗，可以有效率的輸送水與養分。

然而，蔓生植物得以快速生長的代價，就是沒有強壯的莖，無法靠自己的力量挺立。為了向上生長，蔓生植物必須有可攀附的支柱。換言之，就算豆藤有攀爬至天上的能力，如果沒有可倚靠的支柱，仍只能在地上到處蔓生。

那麼，世界上原本就有可以長到天上的植物嗎？

植物要長得巨大，問題在於是否能將水分輸送至頂端。植物將水往上輸送的力量，就是蒸散作用（transpiration）。植物的葉片裡有數個讓空氣進出的口狀器官，稱為「氣孔」。植物裡的水分變成水蒸汽，從氣孔向外蒸發，便是蒸散作用。植物有從氣孔連接到根部的一股水流，就像一條水柱。因此，如果因為蒸散作用而失去水分，水就會往上移動。就像我們一吸吸管，水就被往上吸的感覺。

然而，即使蒸散作用讓水往上移動，但移動得越高，水的重量越重，還是有高度限制。根據一種計算方式，從水往上移動的力量，算出樹木的高度極限大約是一百三十公尺至一百四十公尺。這和現存世界最高的巨杉（giant sequoia，學名Sequoiadendron giganteum）高度一致。遺憾的是，世界上並沒有像童話故事中描述的那樣生長到天上的植物。從現代植物學的知識來看，無法否認的是，豆子可以長到天上的故事完全是錯誤的。

揭開豆子樹的真面目

不過，還有新的疑問。暫不討論植物能否長到天上，先來談談什麼樣的種子可以一個晚上長成大樹。

傑克的豆子一個晚上就長大了，但植物必須進行光合作用才能生長。換言之，植物的生長一定要靠陽光。只有一個大膽的假設可以解決這個疑問，就是假設故事中的豆子是巨大的蘑菇類植物。

我們一般所說的蘑菇，是指菌類的子實體。蘑菇和黴菌是同類植物，一樣靠菌絲增生茁壯。子實體是製造孢子的生殖器官，就像一般植物製造種子的組織「花」一樣。蘑菇會在一個晚上從毫不起眼的菌絲拚命長大；原本眼睛還看不見的纖細菌絲，一夜之間突然變成巨大的子實體，也就是一般所說的蘑菇。蘑菇的菌絲一方面吸收營養，一方面分支增生，不斷向四周蔓延擴展，在一定的季節和發育階段，產生子實體。如果是蘑菇，就可能一夜之間生長完成。

蘑菇通常是靠菌絲的增生慢慢茁壯長大，但一旦受到刺激，立刻形成子實體。例如，大家都知道光或放電等刺激，可以促進蘑菇生長。 自然界一直存在著這種經由刺激而急劇產生質變的現象，如果在遍布地上的菌絲中投入關鍵物質，它們一口氣形成子實體，並非不可能。

傑克拿回來的究竟是什麼種子，至今無人知曉。但說不定是因為傑克的母親將種子丟到窗外，為布滿地面的菌絲帶來某種刺激，使菌絲一夜之間快速長成巨大的蘑菇呢！當然，由於大家都說傑克拿到的是豆子的種子，所以他認為快速長到天上的蘑菇是豆子樹，攀爬上去，也並非不合理的說法吧！

屋外的戒嗔

天明寺的後院有間雜物間，房間沒有鎖，平時用插銷插住房門，裡面沒有貴重物品，只是放置一些平日很少用的東西，很少有人進去，所以雜物房的門一般是關著的。

戒嗔住的地方也在後院，每天從住處去佛堂時，都會經過這個雜物間。有天早晨路過的時候，發現雜物間的門被人打開了，望望屋內，沒有異樣，只是房屋中間彷彿多了一張桌子，戒嗔順手把房門關上。

第二天一早，去佛堂的路上，發現雜物間的門又被人打開了，順手關上，可是一連幾天，被戒嗔關上的房門總會被人打開。

戒嗔有些懷疑是不是調皮的小師弟在和我開玩笑，但想想卻也不可能，因為兩個小師弟起床時間都比我晚，我起床以後，都要叫上很久，他們仍不肯起床；兩人總在早課開始的最後一刻才會跑進佛堂。

那天早晨我特地起很早，等在走道邊，想看個究竟，到底是誰在搗亂，反反覆覆把雜物間的門打開。

我看見智惠師父從住處走來，向戒嗔笑笑。智惠師父問，「今天早晨怎麼起得那麼早？」我還沒有想好應該如何回答，只是傻笑，智惠師父已自顧自的往前走了。

有些問題，問的人並非想要一個答案，只是聽的人在意如何回答。

我看見智惠師父經過雜物間，隨手把插銷拔出，把門推開。他沒進雜物間，逕自往佛堂的方向去了。原來這些天打開雜物間的人是智惠師父。

戒嗔走進雜物間，有股怪怪的味道傳到鼻子裡，判斷怪味的來源，原來是從雜物間放置的桌子新漆中傳出來的；智惠師父這幾天打開房門，是為了散除這股怪味。

我們有多少次站在屋外判斷是非的經歷？我們曾把多少個猜疑和不解放在別人身上找原因？

戒嗔每天關上房門的時候，一直以為自己是對的，卻從沒有想過執迷不悟的人可能是自己。

異數

天才怎麼出現？莫札特真的只是天生好手嗎？其實有天賦還不夠，還牽涉環境。想成為運動明星，要看你幾月出生；數學好不好，要看祖先是不是種稻。環境之後，加上大量努力，才能造就天才。美國暢銷作家葛拉威爾，引用大量統計科學辯證，重新發現「出身」的意義。

「在漢堡，我們必須一連演唱八小時。」 ——約翰．藍儂（John Lennon, 1940-1980）

一九七一年，密西根大學電腦中心落成。龐大的主機，就在電腦中心裡的一間白色大房間內。主機旁邊有幾十部打孔機排排站——這些東西就 是那個時代的終端機，是七○年代最尖端的電腦科技。密西根大學擁有全世界最先進的電腦，不知有幾千名學生，曾在電腦中心那間白色大房間外駐足，看得目瞪口 呆，其中一位就是美國電腦界的奇才——比爾．喬伊（Bill Joy）。

當時的喬伊還是瘦瘦高高的書呆子。喬伊在電腦中心落成的前一年，就來到密西根大學就讀。那年他才十六歲，個子很高，但瘦巴巴的，頭髮 亂得像雜草。他從底特律市郊的北法明頓高中畢業時，是大家公認「最用功的學生」。喬伊說，這意味他是個只會讀書、從不跟女生約會的呆瓜。他本來以為自己會 當生物學家或數學家，但是在大一快結束的時候，他從電腦中心門外走過。當瞥見電腦主機的那一剎那，已無可自拔地愛上了電腦。

從此，他就離不開電腦中心了，一有時間就拚命寫程式。他在一位資訊工程系教授那兒工讀，暑假就能待在電腦中心寫程式。一九七五年，他 申請進入加州大學柏克萊分校的研究所，更進一步埋首於電腦程式世界。他在博士論文口試時，才一會兒工夫，就寫出極其複雜的程式演算法，讓主考官嘖嘖稱奇。 其中一位主考官說道：「這小子就像十二歲的耶穌，既聰明又好學，讓聖殿裡的老師自形慚穢。」

喬伊和幾個熱愛電腦的志同道合之士，為AT&T發展出來的UNIX程式進行修改。喬伊寫的新版UNIX果然青出於藍、功能強大，到今天全世界還有幾百萬部的電腦主機，還在使用這種作業系統。要不是喬伊當年編寫的程式，我們今天恐怕還上不了網際網路。

喬伊離開柏克萊之後，和友人一同在矽谷創辦了昇陽電腦（Sun Microsystems），有人甚至稱他為「網際網路的愛迪生」。耶魯大學資訊科學系教授葛倫特（David Gelernter）說道：「比爾．喬伊是現代電腦發展史上，最有影響力的人物。」

比爾．喬伊的天才事蹟，不知被傳誦多少次了。我們能從他的故事學到什麼？

在這個世界上，是否真有與生俱來的才能？全世界的心理學家，已針對這個問題激辯了幾十年。答案顯然是：是的。問題是，心理學家仔細研究天才型人物的生涯，發現成功最重要的關鍵似乎是準備，而非才能。

音樂神童莫札特　所謂的天才演奏家並不存在

九○年代初期，認知心理學家艾瑞克森（K. Anders Ericsson）等人，曾在柏林一流的音樂學院進行一項研究。他們在該校教授的協助下，把所有主修小提琴的學生分為三組：第一組是「明日之星」，也就是 將來有望成為揚名國際的小提琴家；第二組則只是資質還算不錯；至於第三組則難以成為職業音樂家，日後只能在學校擔任音樂老師。研究人員問每一位修習小提琴 的學生同樣的問題：「從你開始學小提琴的第一天，到目前為止，總共練習了多少個小時？」

這三組學生開始學琴的年紀都差不多，全是在五歲左右。在頭幾年，每一個人練習的時數，大概都是一個星期兩、三個小時。到了八歲，真正的差距開始出現 了，能在班上名列前茅者，練習的時間要比其他學琴的孩子來得長。九歲時，每週練六小時；到了十二歲，每週練八小時；十四歲的時候，每週練十六個小時；到了 二十歲，如果還在努力練習，以職業音樂家為志向，每週練習時數則超過三十個小時。在二十歲之時，這些「明日之星」每一個人總計已練習了一萬個小時。相形之 下，還算不錯的那組，練琴時數總計為八千個小時，至於那些未來只能當音樂老師的，練琴的時間總計不過四千多個小時。

有關艾瑞克森的研究，最令人驚異的就是，他們發現沒有天生演奏家，也沒有只練習一點點就能成為頂尖好手的。從他們的研究結果來看，如果一個學音樂的學生，能進入最好的音樂學院，能成為職業音樂家與否，就看這個學生付出的心血有多少。

如果要成為某一個領域的高手，至少要練習到某一個程度。研究人員相信，真正的專精必須經過一萬個小時的錘鍊。

一萬個小時，這真是個神奇的數字。神經學家列維亭（Daniel Levitin）寫道：「這類研究顯示，一萬個小時的練習或訓練，是成為專家最起碼的要求，不管是作曲家、籃球選手、科幻小說作家、溜冰選手、職業鋼琴 家、棋士，甚至是最厲害的罪犯等，一再印證這個數字：一萬個小時。」

二十年才寫出最偉大作品

就連所謂的「神童」也不例外。就像莫札特，據說他六歲就會作曲。然而，根據心理學家郝爾（Michael Howe）在《天才的解析》（Genius Explained）一書的分析：

從成熟作曲家的標準來看，莫札特早期的作品實在沒有過人之處。最早的作品或許是他父親幫他寫下來的，或是幫他修改過。莫札特兒時創作的曲子，如最早 的七首鋼琴協奏曲，大抵是改編其他作曲家的作品而成。在莫札特的協奏曲中，能展現原創精神最早的一首，就是第九號鋼琴協奏曲（K. 271）。這首曲子已是公認的經典之作，是他在二十一歲那年寫的：那時，他已經不斷創作協奏曲長達十年了。

樂評家熊柏格（Harold Schonberg, 1915-2003）更進一步論道，莫札特其實是「大器晚成」型的作曲家，寫了二十年的曲子之後，才寫出最偉大的作品。

還有，捷克和加拿大國家代表隊選手幾乎沒有九月一日之後出生的，因為那些孩子在八歲的時候，由於體型太小，就不能進入明星隊伍。如此 一來，就沒有額外的練習；沒有額外的練習，十年後也就不能達到一萬個小時的練習時數，當然進不去職業球隊。這個現象和艾瑞克森等人的研究結果相合。

電腦天才喬伊　從小就是個每事問的孩子

一萬個小時當然是很長的一段時間。我們如何能從小不斷的練習，長大成人之時就達到一萬個小時，成為某個領域的傑出人士？首先，你需要父母的鼓勵和支持。此外，你還要有經濟支援。如果為了生活，你不得不去兼差，那就沒有多的時間可以練習。

比爾．喬伊的父親威廉說：「比爾還小的時候，就是個每事問的孩子。我們盡可能回答他的問題，答不出來，就找書給他看。」

在七○年代初期，喬伊還在學習寫程式。那個時代的電腦都像房間那麼大，一部少說也要一百萬美元，但論起效能和記憶體，恐怕還不如你今天使用的微波爐。那時在大的學術機構或公司才能見到電腦。如果你要用電腦，就得上那兒租，租用價格十分昂貴，真是分秒是金。

「鑽漏洞」擴充寫程式時間

一九七一年秋天，比爾．喬伊來到密西根校園之時，正有個機會在等著他。他選擇密西根，不是因為這裡的電腦。他在高中時期還沒學過電腦呢。他有興趣的科目是數學和工程。然而他在大一那年發現電腦中心的系統有個漏洞，於是得以隨心所欲的使用電腦。他快樂得有如置身天堂。

「密大給每一個學生在電腦中心使用的帳號，看使用多少時間，就扣多少錢。註冊的時候，我們先估算自己使用的時間，然後把錢存進這個帳 號，存多少就用多少。就這樣。」提起當年的事，喬伊不禁哈哈笑。「可是有人發現，電腦中心的分時系統有漏洞。如果你輸入一個程式，例如『t=k』，電腦中 心就不會計費了。只要你知道這個漏洞，就可永遠坐在那裡使用電腦。」

讓我們看看比爾．喬伊碰到的幾個機會。首先，他就讀的密西根大學是一個非常有遠見的學校，其次，密大電腦中心系統剛好有個漏洞，讓他 隨時都可以寫程式，沒有時間限制；再者電腦中心是二十四小時開放的，因此他可以整晚都待在那裡；由於他在電腦中心待的時間夠長，才有時間修改UNIX。比 爾．喬伊是個聰明絕頂的年輕人，又很好學，這當然重要，然而如果沒有電腦中心給他學習的機會，他還是難以成為電腦方面的專家。

搖滾傳奇披頭四　他們得想辦法吸引夜總會客人駐足

那麼，一萬個小時是成功的通則嗎？如果我們不只是看表相，透視成功的背後，是否可以發現，類似密西根大學電腦中心或加拿大曲棍球選手選拔制度那樣的機會？

披頭四這四大天王——約翰．藍儂、保羅．麥卡尼（Paul McCartney, 1942-）、喬治．哈里遜（George Harrison, 1943-2001）和林哥．史達（Ringo Starr, 1940-）——在一九六四年二月進軍美國，此即搖滾史上有名的「英倫入侵」事件，發行了一連串瘋狂暢銷的金曲。這股披頭熱不但在美國狂燒，也改變了流行 音樂的風貌。

如果你仔細研究，他們準備了多久才稱霸世界樂壇，你會發現他們努力的軌跡和加拿大曲棍球選手、比爾．喬伊和世界級小提琴家出奇的類似。

話說在草創之初，他們不過是幾個高中生組成的小樂團。一九六○年，有人邀請他們去德國漢堡演出。披頭四傳記《吶喊：披頭四的世代》的 作者諾曼（Philip Norman）說道：「那時漢堡的夜店，不時興搖滾樂團，只有脫衣舞表演。有家夜總會的老闆想做點不同的。老闆名叫布魯諾，他的構想是引進搖滾樂團，在店 裡做不間斷的演出，客人什麼時候來，什麼時候走都沒關係，反正店裡隨時都有樂團在表演，卯足了勁吸引這些過客駐足。」

「那時，有不少在漢堡表演的樂團都是利物浦來的，」諾曼繼續說：「布魯諾去倫敦物色樂團，剛好在蘇荷區碰到一名來自利物浦的生意人。 這名生意人介紹了幾個樂團給他。披頭四就是這樣和布魯諾．柯希邁德（Bruno Koschmider）搭上線。那陣子，披頭四常往漢堡跑，披頭四得到的酬勞並不高，夜總會的音響效果也不夠好，觀眾也非知音。特別的是他們必須不停的表 演。

上台一千二百次換得出名機會

約翰．藍儂在披頭四解散後接受採訪時提到：這是一整晚表演。那時，由於我們是外國人，不得不更加賣力演出，在利物浦，我們一場只演出一個小時。只要唱拿手的，就差不多了。但在漢堡，我們必須一連演唱八小時，不得不找出新的表演方式，免得觀眾看膩了。

從一九六○年到一九六二年底，披頭四總共去了漢堡五次。第一次，他們演出了一百零六個晚上，一次五小時以上。第二次，他們表演了九十 二場。第三次，共演出四十八場，總計在舞台上的時間為一百七十二個小時。最後兩次在漢堡的演出，也就是在一九六二年十一月和十二月，共演出了九十個小時。 總計，他們在一九六四年初嘗成功滋味時，據估計已做過一千二百次現場演出。你知道這是多麼非比尋常嗎？今天，大多數的樂團在全部的表演生涯中，還沒演出過 這麼多次。漢堡的磨練就是他們勝出的關鍵。